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Article 5

RESPONSE
LEA BRILMAYER

Professor Brilmayer responds to the commentaries of Professors
Laycock, Tushnet, and George.
T IS gratifying not only that three scholars have taken the time
to comment on what is essentially only a preliminary sketch of
an approach to interstate discrimination, but that they are scholars
from such different backgrounds. Academic specialization takes its
toll when only choice of law scholars are willing to comment on
choice of law ideas, when constitutional scholars limit their attention to their particular subspecialities of constitutional law, and
when readers of journals turn only to the one article in a hundred
whose concepts and jargon are comfortably familiar. What we lose
in detail and technical flamboyance when we write outside the
fields we know best we often gain in freshness and enthusiasm.
With this in mind, one feels particularly fortunate to have incited
persons with a variety of expertise to address interjurisdictional issues, which sometimes tend to present a rather dry and predictable
appearance.
On the other hand, when one writes in a well-defined specialty
with well-defined schools of thought, one can at least expect a
fiercely fought fight from a well-defined opposition. If the battle
lines are already drawn, then it is guaranteed that someone, somewhere, will have a vested interest in proving that you are not only
wrong, but so pigheadedly and maliciously wrong that you should
never have been allowed to publish your article in the first place.
While such battles (as they say) often shed more heat than light, it
makes for good journal copy. More to the point, it guarantees that
there will be something to say in a rejoinder. Where four persons,
in contrast, find a great deal to agree upon, and proceed to help
develop one another's thoughts, then the probability that there
will be something interesting to put into a rejoinder seems rather
slim.
In particular, I find it virtually impossible to disagree with Professor Laycock. 1 Although he takes a different route than I do, we
come out (as he realizes) in almost exactly the same place. The
primary difference between our approaches lies in the different
styles of justification. Laycock is happy to rely upon the constitu1. Laycock, Equality and the Citizens of Sister States, 15 FLA. ST. L. REV. 431 (1987).
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tional text, with occasional excursions outside the literal text to
ascertain "the needs of the federal union." 2 I agree with him 100%
that the Constitution itself clearly incorporates the right of outsiders to equal treatment, but that it does not compel that outsiders
be given a political voice. One perhaps does not need fancy philosophical arguments, or even the sort of simplistic philosophical arguments that my article offers, to resolve actual litigation challenging discrimination against nonresidents.
I am less convinced, however, that such arguments do not have
other value. While one may well believe that philosophical arguments are not necessary while passing (as a judge) on the constitutionality of state action, there are other important reasons for investigating the philosophical foundations of one's constitutional
principles. What if it were to be proposed that we amend the Constitution to omit any protection prohibiting discrimination against
nonresidents? One would hope that legal scholars would have professional opinions on such a change. This surely requires recourse
to extra-legal arguments.
Theoretical analysis of the basis for constitutional provisions is
not necessarily designed as a tool of judicial activism, as a way to
get judges to ignore what the Constitution says. It may simply be a
way of analyzing whether we like the constitution that we have, or
it may simply be an academic inquiry into an important aspect of
our legal environment. It puzzles me that Professor Laycock would
find such an enterprise dangerous. If nothing else, one wants to
carry on the foundational dialogue initiated by scholars such as
Brainard Currie and John Ely. Academia, for better or worse, is
something of a self-perpetuating enterprise, where law professors
think about the foundations of our legal institutions because the
foundations are there, because they have an important effect on
our lives, and because others have thought about such things
before.
Professor Laycock, of course, does not fault me uniquely for investigating foundations. His more pointed criticism is reserved for
Ely's Democracy and Distrust.' I think he dismisses too quickly
what is an important work of constitutional theory (although one
with which I disagree, as must be obvious). This leads me to clarify
one point, namely the relationship of my arguments to suspect
class theory. Professor Laycock seems to assume that I disagree
2.
3.

Id. at 432.
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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with suspect class analysis. It is not suspect class analysis that I
criticize, however, but one particular explanation for why we have
suspect class analysis.
One might justify suspect class analysis on the ground that certain groups have historically been denied equal rights and therefore discrimination against them ought to be prima facie invalid.
Or one might justify suspect class analysis on the ground that the
drafters of the fourteenth amendment sought to protect certain
groups, and therefore discrimination against those groups ought to
be prima facie invalid. Both of these lines of reasoning differ, however, from the argument that those groups that ought to be protected are exactly the ones that have been systematically denied a
political voice to which they were entitled. This is the argument
that there are "process defects" when some groups are so politically powerless that whether or not they are formally entitled to
vote, they are effectively excluded.
My argument is that this "process defects" theory of suspect
class analysis makes no sense in the interstate context. Some
groups are properly disenfranchised; this is not a "process defect."
For example, nonresidents do not vote and should not be allowed
to vote. I nowhere claim that process theorists actually believe that
nonresidents should be allowed to vote. However, some like Professor George " refer to this exclusion as "wrongful"; characterization
as somehow "wrongful" seems necessary if the exclusion is to be
considered a "process defect." I feel confident that most process
theorists would, upon reflection, agree that nonresidents are properly disenfranchised. Once they admit this point, it is hard to understand how disenfranchisement is a "process defect." It is not
that they believe that nonresidents should vote; it is rather that
the characterization of exclusion as a "process defect" is inconsistent with the fact that nonresidents are properly excluded. This
point is spelled out at greater length in an earlier article of mine.
So it is not suspect class analysis that is suspect, but the assumption that suspect class analysis results from defects in the
majoritarian processes. Notice that the process defects argument
lumps together racial minorities and nonresidents, who surely have
entirely different claims against political exclusion. Political exclusion, therefore, cannot be the explanation, if we analyze as "sus4. George, Asking the Right Questions, 15 FLA. ST. L. REv. 449 (1987).
5. Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the "Inside-Outsider," 134 U. PA. L.
REv. 1291 (1986).
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pect" discrimination against individuals with such different process rights. Professor Laycock and I agree that as a descriptive
matter, legislatures may sometimes feel equally motivated to discriminate against nonresidents and racial minorities. However, it is
the norm requiring equal treatment, and not who should be allowed to vote in a democracy, that makes such discrimination
invalid.
Professor Tushnet addresses entirely different aspects of my article.8 Here is where academic specialization once more threatens
to rear its ugly head. He concedes at the outset that he is (blissfully) ignorant of choice of law theory. I wish that I could get him
to address choice of law theory at greater length, because his interpretation of modern choice of law theory is considerably more attractive than actual modern choice of law theory. A little crossdisciplinary fertilization would add a lot to the subject.
The point at which his understanding of modern choice of law
theory departs from current formulations concerns his efforts to
explain it in terms of democratic participation. The interest analysts, as I pointed out, thought that their theory was compelled by
democratic principles because the courts of one state had an obligation to further the purposes of the democratically elected legislature of that same state. Democracy, under this view, consists of
responsiveness to the wishes of one's own electorate. Thus there is
no need to take into account the needs or interests of persons from
other states. In fact, to do so would be to violate one's duty towards residents.
Since legislators are assumed to care only about the needs of local persons, there is no state interest in applying local law when it
would only work to the benefit of nonresidents. Professor Tushnet
argues that this seems fairly democratic, because it means that the
nonresident will be governed by the law that he or she helped formulate at home. If he or she does not like that law, then the solution should be to change the law at home. Indeed, suggests Professor Tushnet, there might be a process problem if the nonresident
were to be governed by local law (even if that law worked to his or
her benefit). "Citizens . . . would [in that case] be governed by a
law of a state in which they had no representation."7
6. Tushnet, Community and Fairness in Democratic Theory, 15 FLA. ST. L. REV. 417
(1987).
7. Id. at 421.
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As I pointed out in my initial article, however, one cannot simply
argue that it is democratic to deny the. benefits of local law on the
grounds that the nonresident's rights will be determined under
home state law. The reason is that the only circumstance in which
home state law is available to the nonresident is when it works to
his or her disadvantage."
If Professor Tushnet believes that there may be a process difficulty with holding a nonresident to a norm which he or she did not
help formulate, then he ought indeed to be concerned about modern choice of law theories. They are quite willing to hold the nonresident to local law. In fact, there is a state interest in applying
local law in exactly those cases where it helps out a local person at
the expense of an outsider, and in such cases local law will be applied to the detriment of the outsider.
There is more at stake here than simply a quibble about the inanities of modern choice of law theory. Perhaps we should, like
Professor Tushnet, simply be dismissive of modern choice of law.
But one response, similar to my response to Professor Laycock,
who is as uninterested in philosophy as Professor Tushnet is bored
by choice of law, is that there is an important phenomenon in the
legal landscape that we might profit by understanding. If current
thinking contains mistakes, as I believe that it does, it is worth
understanding where these mistakes come from. I believe that the
mistakes in both of the interstate discrimination orthodoxies that I
address arise out of conceptual oversimplification, albeit a seductive one. Improving our understanding of this oversimplification is
the best way to avoid such seduction in the future.
A second reason that this is not just a petty disagreement about
choice of law thinking is that Professor Tushnet's interpretation
changes the very nature of the problem into a question of the
proper size of governmental units. Professor Tushnet's interpreta8. See Brilmayer, Shaping and Sharing in Democratic Theory: Towards a PoliticalPhilosophy of Interstate Equality, 15 FLA. ST. L. REv. 389, 412-13 (1987).
A possible rejoinder [to my criticism of interest analysis] is that in the choice of
law context, the result of a failure to extend the benefits of local law is merely to
apply the law of the other involved state, typically the defendant's home state. If
the defendant participated in the formation of that law, there is no way in which
it can be unfair to hold him or her to it . ..
. . . It would be one thing if the forum merely had a choice of law rule that
made no reference to benefits. . . . the problem with the state interest reasoning
is that unlike such rules, it makes choice of law turn on whether the rule works to
an insider's advantage. The outsider bears all of the burdens of local law, but is
not entitled to its application when that would be beneficial.
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tion of interest analysis leads him directly to that question, because the problem of interest analysis is whether one should be
governed by the law of one's state or by the law of the federal government. In other words, Professor Tushnet's problem is not between two different concepts of the structure of a democracy, but
of two different ways of putting the same structure into effect.
Under Professor Tushnet's interpretation, there is electoral democracy with the electorate composed of state residents, versus electoral democracy with the electorate composed of the residents of the
United States. The two are structurally comparable, but differ only
in scale. The important issue remaining to address, then, is the issue of the size of the appropriate unit.
However, this question of scale is not the real difference between
interest analysis and other democratic theories. The real difference
is a structural question about what democracy requires. The interest analysis version of democratic theory holds that democracy
means responsiveness to the person who voted you into office.
There is no requirement that those who bear the consequences of
the decision be allowed to vote; outsiders can be burdened by application of local law so long as this is in the interest of the local
voters. This is precisely the point of contrast with process-based
theories of constitutional law. Under process theories, there seems
to be some sort of claim to be represented in the decisions that
effect one's interests, such that if one is not represented there is
some sort of "process defect."
The difference between process theory and modern choice of law
is therefore not one of the appropriate scale of the governmental
unit. It is a question about whether officials owe consideration only
to those that elected the official or also to others that are affected
by the decision. Perhaps this can be seen more clearly by holding
constant the size of the governing unit. If one assumes, for instance, that the appropriate unit is the United States of America,
one would still have to address the tension between the interest
analysts' perspective and that of the process theorists. Does democracy require fidelity to the interests of the American public, or
the interests of all persons who bear the consequences of the decision, regardless of whether they are United States residents or not?
Professor Tushnet's discussion of community, while helpful on the
scope question, does not tell us very much about this problem of
what democracy requires.
9.

See L. Brilmayer, Foreign Affairs and the Implausibility of Democracy (forthcoming).
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Professor George's response is similar to Professor Tushnet's in
its willingness to probe the philosophical depths. Like Professor
Tushnet, he embraces the dangerous enterprise against which Professor Laycock warns us. The highly metaphorical nature of some
of his arguments leads me to respond in kind, for his article reminds me of nothing so much as a particularly beautiful passage of
Indonesian poetry by Pramoedya Ananta Toer.' 0
Suara itu hanya terdengar beberapa detik saja dalam hidup.
Getarannya sebentar berdengung, takkan terulangi lagi. Tapi
seperti juga halnya dengan kali Lusi yang abadi menggarisi kota
Blora, dan seperti kali itu juga, suara yang tersimpan menggarisi
kenagan dan ingatan itu mengalir juga-mengalir kemuaranya,
kelaut yang tak bertepi. Dan tak seorangpun tahu kapan laut itu
akan kering dan berhenti berdeburan.
Hilang.
Semua itu sudah hilang dari jangkauan panc[h]a-indera.

10. Quoted in B. ANDERSON, IMAGINED
Florida State University Law Review).
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134-35 (1983) (translation on file,

